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A great deal of attention has 
been paid to the economic effects of 
monetary policy. Until recently, the 
emphasis has been almost entirely on 
the consequences of unanticipated 
changes in policy, or what are referred 
to as monetary policy shocks.  Specifi-
cally, if the Fed were to do something 
unexpected, how would the economy 
respond?  Will output increase or 
decrease in response to the change in 
policy, or will the inflation rate rise 
or fall? 
hen assessing the economic effects of
monetary policy, economists have, until
recently, emphasized the role of
unanticipated changes in policy. But are
these policy shocks likely to be the most important
influence on the economy? Mike Dotsey believes not.
It seems more likely that the Fed’s systematic behavior 
plays a bigger part in what happens in the U.S. economy. 
In this article, Dotsey explains the ways in which
systematic policy influences economic activity.
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Surprises, however, are 
unlikely to be the most important part 
of monetary policy. While no one has 
clairvoyance regarding what the Fed 
will do at a particular point in time, 
financial market participants, as well 
as firms and investors, pay close atten-
tion to how the Fed behaves. Gener-
ally, they are fairly good predictors of 
monetary policy. The Fed, on its part, 
regularly communicates its outlook on 
the economy through speeches and 
congressional testimony. Further, the 
language in FOMC policy statements 
usually gives a fairly clear indication 
of the current stance of policy. With 
all this communication and scrutiny, 
monetary surprises of any consequence 
are likely to be rare events, implying 
that the Fed’s systematic behavior will 
be its primary method of affecting the 
economy — specifically, how the Fed 
moves the interest rate in response 
to economic variables such as infla-
tion and output growth. This article 
explores the ways in which systematic 
policy influences economic activity.1
In doing so, I will analyze 
two different policies that have the 
same long-term goal: price stability. 
One policy is the long-held monetarist 
prescription of a constant growth rate 
of money; the other is an interest rate 
rule that attempts to keep the price 
level fixed. The economic response to 
an increase in the level of productivity 
relative to its trend is much different 
under these two policies. The inter-
est-rate rule allows the economy to 
take full advantage of the increase in 
productivity. The constant-money-
growth-rate rule does not and, instead, 
dampens the effects of increased 
productivity, leading to what appears 
to be a much smoother path for output 
and employment. This smoother 
behavior reduces economic welfare in 
the sense that everyone is less well-off 
and highlights one important lesson 
of this article, namely, that smoothing 
output fluctuations is not necessarily 
good policy.
Given that different mon-
etary policy designs affect the way the 
economy reacts to economic distur-
bances, it would be interesting to ex-
amine how well, in theory, a rule that 
approximates current Federal Reserve 
behavior performs. As I will show, 
1 Recent articles that also emphasize the role of 
systematic policy are my 1999 and 2002 articles 
and the one by Jordi Gali, David Lopez-Salido, 
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influence economic activity?
As Satyajit Chatterjee 
describes in his 1995 article, when 
productivity is high, output, employ-
ment, and investment are also high. 
Figure 2 examines the behavior of four 
very important variables following a 
shock to productivity. This behavior 
is based on a simple theoretical model 
known as a real-business-cycle model. 
The key point about this model is that 
it describes the correlation of these 
see, the changes are quite variable, 
sometimes exceeding 2 percent. A 
positive change in productivity of 2 
percent means that 2 percent more 
output can be produced using the same 
amount of capital and labor. The other 
important feature shown in Figure 1 
is the high degree of co-movement 
between changes in productivity and 
economic growth. When the change 
in productivity is positive, output tends 
to grow strongly; when it’s negative, 
output growth is often negative as well. 
The correlation coefficient between 
productivity shocks and output growth 
is 0.83.2 Thus, changes in productiv-
ity appear to be quite important to 
economic growth. Given their impor-
tance, how does monetary policy affect 
the way these productivity shocks 
it appears that the design of policy is 
actually quite good. 
CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY
In exploring the importance 
of systematic monetary policy, I will 
concentrate on how changes in produc-
tivity influence economic activity and, 
in turn, how monetary policy affects 
that influence. The level of productiv-
ity determines how much output can 
be produced from a particular amount 
of labor and capital. The more that can 
be produced, the more productive the 
economy is. Multi-factor productivity is 
a broad concept that includes not only 
technological innovations such as new 
inventions or improved machines that 
increase production but also advances 
in management practices or ways of or-
ganizing labor that enhance efficiency. 
In addition, changes in 
government regulation or the legal 
environment can influence how many 
goods or services can be produced from 
a given amount of labor and capital. 
Basically, anything that affects the ef-
ficiency of productive inputs falls under 
the heading of a change in productiv-
ity. 
With respect to various types 
of shocks, the economic effects of 
changes in productivity are perhaps the 
best understood and most clearly delin-
eated of all economic shocks.  Econo-
mists have described the importance of 
productivity changes for business-cycle 
behavior, and indeed, more scientific 
attention has been paid to the effects 
of changes in productivity than to the 
effects of any other economic distur-
bance.
To get an idea of the impor-
tance that changes in productivity 
have for movements in output, Figure 
1 graphs changes in productivity, 
measured as a deviation from trend 
growth (productivity shocks), along 
with output growth in the United 
States from 1948 to 2000. As you can 
Economists have described the importance
of productivity changes for business-cycle
behavior.
FIGURE 1
Productivity Shocks and Output Growth
2 The correlation coefficient measures the 
degree to which variables move together. A 
correlation coefficient of 1 means that the 
variables move in lock step; a correlation 
coefficient of 0 implies that the variables are 
unrelated; and a correlation coefficient that 
is negative means that the variables move in 
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important variables and gives us a 
theory as to why productivity affects 
the economy the way it does. 
An important feature of 
the model is that there are no im-
pediments to allocating resources or 
changing prices. All prices are flexible 
and changed costlessly. Specifically, 
the price of a good changes whenever 
the marginal cost of producing the 
good changes. Similarly, the wage rate 
and the rental rate on capital change 
whenever there is a change in 
productivity. Although not totally
realistic, the model provides a neces-
sary and important benchmark for 
evaluating the effects of monetary 
policy in a more realistic environment. 
First, examine the behavior 
of the productivity shock itself and 
output. The two variables are
graphed in the upper left part of Figure 
2. Each variable is plotted relative to 
its normal level.
Take productivity, for 
instance. A value of 0 means that pro-
ductivity is at its normal level, not that 
there is no productivity. A value of 1 
implies that productivity has increased 
1 percent above its normal level. The 
shock to productivity we examine is 
one that dies out slowly over time and 
is the type of productivity shock that 
FIGURE 2
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is typically studied in business-cycle 
analysis.
Because higher productiv-
ity implies that more output can be 
produced from the same amount of 
capital and labor, it is not surprising 
that output should be high when pro-
ductivity is high and that as the shock 
to productivity dissipates, so does the 
increase in output. It is important to 
note, however, that output rises a good 
deal more than productivity. For this 
to occur, other factors of production 
— that is, inputs such as capital and 
labor — must increase as well. If they 
did not, the behavior of output would 
exactly mirror the behavior of pro-
ductivity. The magnified increase in 
output is primarily due to an increase 
in hours worked or employment. 
This increase is depicted 
in the bottom left panel of Figure 2. 
Why should people work harder when 
productivity is high? When productiv-
ity is high, so is the amount of output 
that can be produced from an hour 
of work. Higher labor productivity 
translates into an increased demand 
for labor by firms and into higher real 
wages. Higher real wages induce people 
to work more. For example, in times 
of very high productivity, firms often 
ramp up production and increase the 
amount of overtime paid to workers. 
The other avenue that leads 
to an increase in output that is greater 
than the increase in productivity is 
investment. Higher productivity not 
only makes labor more productive, it 
also makes capital more productive. As 
a result, there is a greater demand for 
capital and a higher return to owners 
of capital. This higher return spurs 
investment, which results in a larger 
capital stock.
The higher return to capital 
is reflected in a higher real interest 
rate, which is displayed in the bot-
tom right panel of Figure 2. The real 
interest rate is the difference between 
the nominal rate of interest – the rate 
at which each of us borrows and lends 
– and the expected rate of inflation. It 
indicates how many more goods can be 
consumed in the future if one sacri-
fices current consumption and saves 
a bit more. Similarly, the marginal 
product of capital indicates how many 
more goods will be produced when the 
capital stock is increased by one unit. 
The way to increase the capital stock is 
to forgo some consumption and invest. 
Therefore, a higher marginal product 
of capital implies that more goods can 
be consumed in the future if current 
consumption is sacrificed in favor of 
more investment. Thus, a higher mar-
ginal product of capital is associated 
with a higher real interest rate. The 
rise in the real interest rate is ben-
eficial. It is a consequence of greater 
productivity and encourages saving, 
which, in turn, provides the means for 
greater investment.
Finally, a very important 
point to understand about the cascade 
of effects that occurs because of an 
increase in productivity is that these 
effects are optimal from the standpoint 
of every individual in the economy. 
The increases in output, hours worked, 
investment, and the real interest rate 
result from individuals and firms tak-
ing advantage of the rise in productiv-
ity. The increase in productivity has 
created additional opportunities for 
producing, raised wages, and raised 
the return on investing. All the deci-
sions made by households and firms 
are voluntary and reflect the efforts of 
each entity to maximize welfare and 
profits. Further, there is nothing to 
prevent the economy from responding 






In the previous discussion, 
the economic response to an increase 
in productivity was instantaneous. 
Notably, the prices of all products 
adjusted immediately. In such a setting, 
monetary policy is irrelevant. Such an 
environment is, however, unrealistic. 
That lack of realism implies that to 
understand the importance of mon-
etary policy, we must provide a better 
description of the economy. 
The major change will 
involve altering the assumption of 
perfect flexibility in prices. There is 
substantial evidence that firms do 
not adjust prices instantaneously. For 
example, Alan Blinder and co-authors 
have surveyed firms and found that 
many firms do not change the price of 
their products for up to a year. Mark 
Bils and Peter Klenow, in their recent 
and detailed look at price changes of 
goods and services, examined the price 
behavior of more than 350 products 
and documented how frequently the 
price of each good changed. They 
found that many prices remain fixed 
for up to six months, although 30 to 
40 percent of prices do change each 
quarter. 
To capture this facet of 
behavior, we will assume that each 
firm adjusts its price once a year, with 
25 percent of all firms adjusting prices 
in each quarter.3 That is, in any given 
3 A more rigorous treatment of price adjustment, 
like the one I developed with Robert King and 
Alex Wolman, can be used without changing 
the main thrust of the results presented in this 
section.
There is substantial 
evidence that firms
do not adjust prices 
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quarter, 25 percent of firms adjust their 
price and 75 percent of firms charge 
the same price they charged in the 
previous quarter. This type of price 
adjustment is referred to as a Taylor 
contract because it is based on the 
work of John Taylor.  
When price setting is slug-
gish, economic behavior depends on 
monetary policy. The policy I examine 
first is constant money growth. This 
particular policy, which has a long tra-
dition in monetary theory, is most no-
tably associated with Milton Friedman. 
The main justification for prescribing 
this policy is that it controls the rate 
of long-run inflation while at the same 
time providing enough money, on 
average, for the economy to efficiently 
carry out the desired amount of trans-
actions. 
However, as a response to 
a persistent increase in productivity, 
this policy does not look like a good 
one. Even though this policy makes 
the economy behave in a smoother, or 
less volatile, fashion than occurs in the 
real-business-cycle model, individuals 
are less well off. The sluggishness in 
price setting translates into an overall 
sluggishness in activity. 
First, examine output, as 
shown in the top left panel of Figure 
3. Now, it increases only by about 
half the increase in productivity. The 
reason for this lack of responsive-
FIGURE 3
Sticky Prices and Constant-Money-Growth Rule10   Q1  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org www.phil.frb.org
ness is seen in the bottom left panel, 
which shows that employment actually 
falls. In contrast to what happens in 
the flexible-price real-business-cycle 
model, the increase in productivity 
is actually causing employment to 
decline. Thus, workers are losing out 
on a big portion of potential gains. 
Investment is also comparatively less 
responsive, and the real interest rate 
declines.
Why does the economy 
behave so differently? The key reason 
is the sluggishness of price adjust-
ment. The inability of firms to lower 
their prices in response to increased 
productivity and the resulting lower 
costs of production interact with mon-
etary policy, producing the economic 
outcome depicted in Figure 3. The key 
reason the economy does not expand 
as vigorously as in the real-business-
cycle model is that overall demand 
is linked to the amount of money 
in the economy. With money grow-
ing at a prefixed rate, demand does 
not increase as fast as productivity; 
instead, demand increases at the same 
prefixed rate as money. That means 
the dollar amount of goods bought 
is not growing fast enough to take 
advantage of the economy’s increased 
productive capacity. Because prices 
are more or less fixed, the number of 
goods purchased is well below what the 
economy is capable of producing. With 
greater production efficiency, less labor 
is needed to satisfy the modest increase 
in demand. Rather than benefiting 
from being more productive, workers 
actually lose out. 
Over time, as firms are free to 
lower their prices, output continues to 
increase, and eventually, employment 
increases as well. After every firm has 
adjusted the price of its product, the 
behavior of the economy begins to 
look like the behavior of the real-busi-
ness-cycle economy. Output, employ-
ment, investment, and the real interest 
Rigidity in price
setting has serious 
consequences for 
economic behavior.
     Business Review Business Review  Q1  2004   11   Q1  2004   11 Business Review Business Review  Q1  2004   11 Business Review Business Review
rate return to their average values as 
the increase in productivity dies out. 
An important point of this 
exercise is that the constant-money-
growth rule actually smoothes the 
economic response of output to the in-
crease in productivity. Output does not 
immediately rise as much in response 
to a change in productivity and in-
creases only gradually. This smoothing 
of output’s behavior is not a good thing 
and results in additional volatility of 
employment. Individuals would be 
better off if they could respond more 
aggressively to the increase in produc-
tivity and take maximum advantage of 
productivity when it is at its highest.
The basic lesson of this sec-
tion is that rigidity in price setting has 
serious consequences for economic 
behavior. The fact that firms are un-
able to change prices flexibly means 
that the optimal degree of economic 
expansion cannot take place under 
the constant-money-growth rule. If 
monetary policy were more expansion-
ary in the face of the opportunities 
afforded by the increase in productiv-
ity, nominal output — that is, output 
measured in current dollars — could 
increase and so could real output — 
output measured in constant dollars, 
that is, adjusted for inflation. Such 
policy could, in principle, help the 






prices were in fact flexible. In doing so, 
that policy would increase economic 
welfare.
BETTER MONETARY POLICY
We just witnessed how 
sluggishness in price adjustment can 
impair the economy’s response to a 
productivity shock. Can a central bank 
do something about this? For example, 
what if the central bank could make 
it desirable for firms to keep their 
prices constant even if they could 
freely change them? Then the lack of 
price flexibility might not present any 
impediment, and a better economic 
outcome would follow. 
For example, suppose that 
firms thought the central bank could 
keep the overall price level from mov-
ing. A firm would then want to keep 
its prices in line with what other firms 
were expected to charge and not raise 
its price today. If a firm has no desire 
to change its prices, the fact that prices 
are inflexible will be of no conse-
quence. One might guess that in such 
circumstances, the economy would 
behave very much like a flexible-price 
economy. The key question is whether 
the central bank can engineer this 
type of behavior in response to a 
change in productivity.
The answer is yes. The 
central bank can, in fact, make this 
happen by following an interest-rate 
rule, aggressively raising the interest 
rate if prices start to rise or aggressively 
lowering the interest rate if prices start 
to fall. In our model economy, this 
policy leads to the economic outcomes 
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First, if we compare Figures 
2 and 4, it is clear this policy dupli-
cates the flexible-price outcome. The 
combination of the interest-rate rule 
the central bank is following and the 
initial desire for firms to lower their 
prices leads to a drastic increase in the 
supply of money. Basically, the interest-
rate rule implies that the central bank 
will supply enough money so that the 
demand for goods and services (out-
put) increases exactly as much as the 
supply of goods and services would in-
crease under flexible prices. The result 
is that demand and supply are equal 
at the initial price level and there is 
no incentive for firms to change their 
price. Prices remain fixed, and the 
increase in output is identical to what 
happened when money was fixed and 
prices fell. Under flexible prices, real 
output rose 1.4 percent and prices fell 
1.4 percent, leaving the demand for 
money unchanged at its fixed supply. 
Under the interest-rate rule, prices 
remain the same, output again rises 
1.4 percent, and the supply of money 
increases 1.4 percent to support the 
increased output. 
Because there is no change 
in prices, the nominal interest rate 
does not have to react to a change in 
the price level. Any pressure for the 
price level to fall ends up pumping 
money into the economy to keep the 
price level from moving. The nominal 
FIGURE 4
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rapidly or by sizable amounts in any 
one quarter. 
The economy’s response to 
the changes in productivity under 
a realistic estimation of policy is 
displayed in Figure 5. In fact, an 
estimated rule meant to capture the 
way the Fed responds to the economy 
implies that policy does fairly well in 
the sense that the response of output, 
employment, and investment is similar 
to that which would occur if prices 
were flexible. 
In comparing the behavior of 
output, employment, and investment, 
one sees a slightly stronger response 
than occurs when prices are flexible. 
However, the overall pattern of activity 
is quite close to what is optimal, and 
it appears that an estimate of actual 
policy is fairly well designed for dealing 
with persistent changes in productivity. 
That is what one should expect if the 
Fed is doing a proper job of responding 
to underlying changes, or shocks, to 
the economy. The reason the economy 
responds slightly more aggressively 
is that monetary policy is a little bit 
easier. That is, the interest rate is 
slightly lower than what would be 
optimal if changes in productivity were 
the only type of shock that affected 
the economy. The Fed actually eases 
policy a bit, and the nominal interest 
rate is lower under the estimated rule 
than under an interest-rate rule that 
targets the price level. This relative 
easing of policy pumps more money 
into the economy, which, in turn, 
supports a higher level of activity.
interest rate moves one for one with 
the underlying real interest rate, and 
an optimal use of economic resources 
ensues. The latter point is one of the 
main messages in recent work by Rob-
ert King and Alexander Wolman. 
A question that naturally 
arises from this analysis is: Why don’t 
central banks follow this rule in prac-
tice? The answer is that for other types 
of shocks, such as demand shocks 
(for example, changes in govern-
ment spending), this policy would not 
produce the best economic outcome. A 
different policy, generally one that ac-
commodated some short-run increase 
in inflation, can make people better 
off.  In our simplified experiment, we 
assumed the monetary policymaker 
knew the exact nature of the economic 
disturbance. In practice, that would 
not be the case; so the central bank 
may not be able to react in as precise 
a fashion as it does in the particular 
example discussed here. Also, accurate 
contemporaneous knowledge of what 
is happening to the economy as well 
as the fact that economic variables 
are often measured with error further 
complicates the design of actual policy. 
However, one key element of the anal-
ysis presented above does carry over to 
more complicated and richer inves-
tigations of policy: The central bank 
should not try to smooth economic 
activity but rather let the economy ef-
ficiently allocate resources in response 
to whatever shock has occurred. 
ACTUAL POLICY
The lesson from the previous 
section is that it’s possible for monetary 
policy to induce an optimal economic 
response to changes in productivity 
even in the presence of sluggish price 
adjustment. In reality, the economy is 
buffeted by many types of shocks. For 
example, changes in fiscal policy or 
changes in private demand, perhaps 
induced by large swings in equity or 
housing prices, are all recognizable 
features of the real world. Designing 
the optimal response to all of these 
types of shocks is a difficult proposi-
tion, which recent advances in theory 
are beginning to address. 
Policymakers, however, do 
not have the luxury of waiting for 
theorists and must do the best they 
can in an uncertain environment.  It 
would, therefore, be an interesting 
exercise to examine how well a 
policy rule estimated over the period 
1987Q1 through 2000Q4 under Alan 
Greenspan’s chairmanship does in 
response to a persistent productivity 
disturbance. 
Because policy should be 
designed to respond well to all types 
of shocks, a central bank’s behavior 
should not be expected to mimic the 
simple rule in the preceding section. 
But if designed appropriately, actual 
policy should not do too badly with 
respect to any particular shock. The 
rule I investigate, which is the one 
estimated by William English, Wil-
liam Nelson, and Brian Sack, involves 
tightening policy in response to infla-
tion above a specified target and when 
output is above its trend growth rate. 
One should not interpret the latter 
response as an attempt to smooth ac-
tivity, but rather as a recognition that 
when the economy is growing strongly, 
real interest rates should be high. The 
rule also involves a significant degree 
of interest-rate smoothing or inertia in 
policy, reflecting a concern on the part 
of the Fed for moving interest rates too 
Accurate contemporaneous knowledge of
what is happening to the economy as well
as the fact that economic variables are often
measured with error further complicates the 
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SUMMARY
The systematic portion of 
monetary policy has an effect on eco-
nomic activity because it influences 
the price-setting behavior of firms and 
the level of demand.  A constant-mon-
ey-growth rule drastically inhibits the 
economy’s ability to respond efficiently 
to a change in productivity, whereas an 
interest-rate rule that targets the price 
level allows the economy to respond 
efficiently. Further, an estimated 
interest-rate rule fitted to the period 
corresponding to Alan Greenspan’s 
chairmanship supports efficient use of 
resources in our model economy when 
it is subjected to a persistent increase 
in productivity. 
FIGURE 5
Sticky Prices and Fed Policy Rule
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